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In the absence of some special provision in the Workmen's
Compensation Act it would be possible for an employer to avoid
his compensation responsibility merely by interposing an inde-
pendent contractor or sub-contractor between himself and his
employees. This, of course, would not deprive the employee of
protection so long as the intermediary contractor is solvent or
protected by insurance. However, the possibility of using an
impecunious middle man as a means of dodging compensation
remains, and it was necessary to prevent this by subjecting cer-
tain principals to the compensation claims of their contractors'
employees. A provision of this type is found in most compen-
sation acts,' and the principal who is affected thereby is com-
monly known as a statutory employer. Section Six of the Lou-
isiana Act sets forth the obligations of such a principal.2
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The employer of an independent contractor is liable to the latter's
employees, except in the following states: California: Cal. Stats. (1927) p.
1475, repealing Cal. Stats. (1917) p. 853; Delaware: Del. Rev. Code (1935)
§ 6105(35); Iowa: no provision; Maine: Me. Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 26, § 53;
New Hampshire: no provision; North Dakota: no provision; Rhode Island:
no provision; West Virginia: no provision.
In Arizona the principal is liable for compensation to the employees of
an independent contractor engaged In work which is part of the employer's
trade if the principal retains supervision or control. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939)
§ 56-928.
In the absence of a provision subjecting the principal to the compensa-
tion claims of the contractor's employees, the liability of the principal
depends upon his right to control the claimant's work. In other words,
the claimant must establish that he was in effect a sub-employee of defend-
ant at the time of injury. Niemann v. Iowa Electric Co., 218 Iowa 127, 253
N.W. 815 (1934); Manock v. Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc., 86 N.H. 104, 164
Atl. 211 (1933). Cf. Blasdel v. Industrial Commission, 65 Ariz. 373, 181 P.(2d)
620 (1947).
2. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 6, as amended:
"Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes
to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business or occupation
or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person (in
this section referred to as contractor) for the execution by or under the
contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the princi-
pal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the
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All the provisions of Section Six make clear the fact that
the sole purpose of this section is to prevent the evasion of com-
pensation as suggested above.3 As between the principal and
the contractor, it is fair that the latter, as the employer of the
claimant, should bear the risk of accident. For this reason,
the principal who is made liable under Section Six is entitled
to indemnity and he can interplead the contractor and demand
judgment over against him.4 The net effect is that the principal
merely lends his solvency to the worker's claim, and he can
effectively protect himself in advance either by satisfying him-
self that the contractor is solvent or by insisting that the latter
insure against work accidents.
execution of the work or his dependent any compensation under this act
which he would have been liable to pay if that employee had been immedi-
ately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from or pro-
ceedings are taken against the principal, then, in the application of this act,
refer ence to the principal shall be substituted for reference to the employer,
except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference
to the earnings of the employee under the employer by whom he is im-
mediately employed.
"2. Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section,
he shall be entitled to indemnity from any person who independently of this
section would have been liable to pay compensation to the employee or his
dependent and shall have a cause of action therefor.
"3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing an employee
or his dependent from recovering compensation under this act from the
contractor instead of from the principal.
"4. A principal contractor, when sued by an employee of a subcontractor
or his dependent, shall have the right to call that subcontractor or any
intermediate contractor or contractors as a co-defendant, and the principal
contractor shall be entitled to indemnity from his subcontractor for com-
pensation payments paid by the principal contractor on account of an acci-
dental injury to the employee of the subcontractor."
Constitutionality. In Clementine v. Ritchie, 1 La. App. 296 (Orl. 1924),
the validity of Section Six was sustained against the objection that it vio-
lates Art. I, § 2, Art. III, § 16 and Art. IV, § 15 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1921. See also Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199,
130 So. 1 (1930).
3. A survey of the corresponding provisions of the compensation acts
of other states makes this clear beyond doubt:
In the acts of four states it is expressly provided that the principal is
liable only if there is a device or scheme to avoid liability by letting out
the work: Alabama: Ala. Code (1949) tit. 26, § 310; Minnesota: Minn. Stat.
Ann. (1946) § 176.30; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 48-116; Texas:
Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stats. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 8307, § 6.
In fifteen other states there is no compensation liability of principal
where the contractor has secured or insured his compensation liability:
Arkansas: Ark. Act 319 of 1939, § 6; Colorado: Colo. Stat. Ann. (Mitchie,
1935) c. 97, § 328; Florida: Fla. Stat. Arin. (1943) § 440.10; Idaho: Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) § 43-1611; Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 48, §
168; Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1940) § 40-1214; Massachusetts: Mass.
Ann. Laws (1942) c. 152, § 18; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) § 176.30;
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 3698; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat.
(1943) § 48-116; New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940) § 34:15-79; New York:
Workmen's Compensation Law (1913) § 56; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat.
(1943) § 97-19; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 85, § 11.
4. Discussed at p. 42, infra.
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY
The purpose of Section Six as a means of preventing the
evasion of compensation is again made clear by the fact that it
comes into operation only when the work let by contract is a part
of the regular business of the principal.5 Normally the worker
must be satisfied to accept the financial status of his immediate
employer. It is neither expedient in policy nor workable from an
administrative viewpoint to require that all persons who in any
way accept the services of a contractor must lay themselves open
to suit by the latter's employees. Thus a principal is not fairly
subject to suspicion of seeking to avoid his compensation lia-
bility unless he has attempted to relegate a part of his own
regular operations to a contractor.
Who Is a Principal?
The language of Section Six indicates that a principal is any
person who undertakes to carry out any work which is a part
of his trade, business or occupation, by means of a contract with
another; or any person who has contracted to perform work and
sub-lets any portion to another.6 However, it has been argued
that the section is intended to cover only the situation where a
contractor sub-lets a part of his contracted work to a sub-con-
tractor, and should not include the proprietor of a business who
contracts out a part of his own independent operations. This
argument finds some support, perhaps, in the language of Para-
graph Four of Section. Six. This paragraph confers upon a
principal contractor who is sued for compensation by an em-
ployee of a sub-contractor the right to call in the sub-contractor
as codefendant. No mention is made of a corresponding right of
a principal who seeks indemnity from a contractor.7 It seems
likely, however, that the change in the designation of parties in
Paragraph Four is the result of inadvertence.
The Louisiana courts have conclusively adopted the position
that Section Six embraces the principal-contractor relationship
as well as the relation of contractor and sub-contractor," although
there has been occasional dissent both in the courts of appeal9
5. Discussed at p. 35, infra.
6. See text of La. Act 20 of 1914, § 6, as amended, note 2, supra.
7. As to this, see p. 43, infra.
8. Clementine v. Ritchie, 1 La. App. 296 (Orl. 1924); Zeller v. Louisiana
Cypress Lumber Co., 121 So. 670 (La. App. Orl. 1928); Jackson v. Forest
Product Chemical Co., 121 So. 676 (La. App. Orl. 1929); Seabury v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Corp., 127 So. 25 (La. App. 2d cir. 1930), affirmed in Seabury
v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 130 So. 1 (1930).
9. See special concurring opinion of Janvier, J., in Zeller v. Louisiana
Cypress Lumber Co., 121 So. 670, 673 (La. App. Orl. 1928). See also dicta
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and in the supreme court. 10 The majority position seems clearly
correct. No other interpretation could be made without violence
to the language of this section when taken in its entirety; like-
wise, there is no conceivable reason of policy to justify restricting
the operation of the section to the situation where one contractor
lets out part of his contracted work to a sub-contractor. The
section has been employed so as to hold both principal and
principal contractor in connection with a wide range of haz-
ardous businesses," and it has been held to include as prin-
cipal a municipal corporation that conducted construction opera-
tions through the assistance of a federal relief agency 12 which
was regarded as an independent contractor.
Of course, there must be a subsisting agreement between the
alleged principal and contractor. It has been held, for example,
that an offer to employ an independent contractor which con-
templates a notice of acceptance, does not give rise to an action
under Section Six where notice of acceptance has not been given,
even though the contractor has started to work.13 Also, the re-
quired relationship does not come into being simply by reason
of the fact that a principal contractor and the claimant are work-
ing on a common enterprise, unless the claimant is employed by
a sub-contractor under the defendant.' 4
in following cases: Brasher v. Industrial Lumber Co., 165 So. 524, 525 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1936); Jones v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 3 La. App. 85, 87,
88 (2d cir. 1925); Brown v. Weber King Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 596, 597
(1st cir. 1925). Cf. dissenting opinion of Elliott, J., in Lutz v. Long-Bell
Lumber Sales Corp., 153 So. 319, 321 (La. App. 1st cir. 1934), rehearing
denied 154 So. 645 (1934), suggesting that if principal is to be held, he must
control details of work.
10. See dissenting opinion of Rogers, J., in Seabury v. Natural Gas
Corp., 171 La. 199, 206, 130 So. 1, 3 (1930).
11. In the following illustrative cases defendant contracted out a part
of his regular business to an independent contractor. Compensation was
allowed the latter's employees without comment upon the present problem:
Hollinsworth v. Crossett Lumber Co., 153 So. 722 (La. App. 2d cir. 1934)
(lumbering); Snyder v. Kolb, 123 So. 454 (La. App. 2d cir. 1929) (same);
Dandridge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 192 So. 887 (La. App.
2d cir. 1939) (oil drilling); Lindsey v. White, 22 So.(2d) 689 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1945) (same); James v. Dear & Johnson, Inc., 172 So. 25 (La. App. 1st
cir. 1937) (operator of gravel pit).
In the following illustrative cases defendant was himself a contractor
and let out part of his work under a subcontract. Compensation was allowed
the employee of the subcontractor: Hardoman v. Glassell-Wilson Co., Inc., 5
La. App. 203 (2d cir. 1926) (construction contractor sublet steel work);
Griffin v. Hotard, 7 La. App. 604 (1st cir. 1928) (similar); Williams v. O.K.
Construction Co., 151 So. 784 (La. App. 2d cir. 1934) (contractor for levee
work sublet hauling); Davis v. Buckley, 153 So. 303 (La. App. 2d cir. 1934)
(contractor for timbering sublet a portion of the work).
12. Washington v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 180 So.
199 (La. App. Orl. 1938).
13. Young v. Petty Stave & Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 90 (2d cir. 1927).
14. Baham v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 78 Fed. Supp. 665 (W.D. La., 1948).
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Independent Contractor Distinguished from Seller or Buyer
Section Six of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not
brought into operation unless the relationship of principal and
contractor exists between the defendant and the claimant's em-
ployer. The employees of a seller have no claim for compensation
against the buyer of the article upon which they worked unless
they were also employees of the buyer and were subject to his
control.15
The buyer is not made liable to the seller's employees by
Section Six even though an exclusive buying and selling agree-
ment existed; 16 nor is it of any consequence that the buyer re-
served the right to reject commodities sold under the contract,'7
nor that he discharged taxes which were properly chargeable
against the seller' 8 or otherwise assisted the seller in keeping
his records in order.' 9 Likewise, the buyer is not subjected to
compensation because he furnished materials or tools to enable
the seller to fulfill his contract.20 Even the fact that the buyer
paid the seller's employees 2' or carried compensation insurance
for their protection 22 has not served to make him liable for com-
pensation under this Section.
The great bulk of the cases in which the defendant claimed
immunity from Section Six liability because of his status as pur-
chaser have arisen in connection with lumbering transactions.23
Not infrequently the owner of a tract of timberland undertakes
to log his own property under a contract to sell the timber to
15. Harville v. Eicher-Woodland Lbr. Co., 3 La. App. 406 (2d cir. 1926).
16. Langley v. Widow and Heirs of McDonald, 7 La. App. 715 (2d cir.
1927); Williams v. George, 15 So. (2d) 823 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943).
17. West v. Martin Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 366 (1st cir. 1927); Anthony
v. Natalbany Lumber Co., Ltd., 187 So. 288 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939).
18. Whitley v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards Inc., 142 So. 798 (La. App. 1st
cir. 1932) (severance tax on timber). However, when it is doubtful whether
.the relationship Is that of buyer and seller or principal and contractor,
the fact that the severance tax was charged against the intermediary may
be persuasive. Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Co., 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1942).
19. Williams v. George, 15 So.(2d) 823 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943).
20. Windham v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932); Scott
v. Futrell, 197 So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940).
21. Miller v. Brenner Lumber Co., 8 La. App. 141 (2d cir. 1928); Eaves
v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir. 1932).
22. Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir.
1932).
23. From a total of twenty-seven reported cases in which the problem
was presented, only the following three cases related to transactions other
than lumbering: Brown v. City of Shreveport, 15 So.(2d) 234 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1943); Wilson v. Roberts, 194 So. 88 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940); Jones v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939).
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a mill or other lumber concern. It is clear that under such cir-
cumstances the owner's employees have no valid claim against
the buyer in the event of injury.2 4
More often, however, the alleged seller occupies the position
of a middleman between the landowner and defendant, the
ultimate buyer. He negotiates a purchase of timber from the
owner with a definite resale transaction to defendant in pros-
pect. Usually he is financially insolvent and his employee's com-
pensation claims against him are worthless. Nevertheless, the
courts have consistently held that the purchasing mill or concern
cannot be made liable either as a partner of the middleman
under Section One,25 or as a principal under Section Six. 26 This
is apparently not affected by the fact that whatever remuneration
the middleman may receive comes solely by reason of the labor
bestowed by him and his employees in severing and transport-
ing the timber.27
The opinions that have dealt with this type of transaction
abound in statements to the effect that the courts are alert to
detect the use of the resale device as a means of avoiding com-
pensation liability whenever the middleman is in fact an em-
24. Morrison v. Weber-King Mfg. Co., 6 La. App. 388 (1st cir. 1927);
Langley v. Widow and Heirs of McDonald, 7 La. App. 715 (2d cir. 1927);
West v. Martin Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 366 (1st cir. 1927); Miller v. Brenner
Lumber Co., 8 La. App. 141 (2d cir. 1928); Williams v. George, 15 So.(2d)
823 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943).
If, however, the wood is being procured from property owned by de-
fendant, the latter will be regarded as employer of a contractor: James v.
Dear & Johnson, Inc., 172 So. 25 (La. App. 1st cir. 1937); Owers v. Louisiana
Long Leaf Lumber Co., 14 So.(2d) 275 (La. App. 1st cir. 1943).
25. Langley v. Widow and Heirs of McDonald, 7 La. App. 715 (2d cir.
1927); Vincent v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 593 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941).
26. Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir.
1932); Whitley v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 142 So. 798 (La. App. 1st
cir. 1932); Windham v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932);
Brasher v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 165 So. 524 (La. App. 1st cir. 1936);
Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939); Harris
v. Southern Kraft Corp., 183 So. 65 (La. App. 2d cir. 1938); Weldon v. Pick-
ering Lumbering Corp., 186 So. 371 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Anthony v.
Natalbany Lumber Co., Ltd., 187 So. 288 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Scott v.
Futrell, 197 So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940); Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co.,
199 So. 587 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941); Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc.,
199 So. 590 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941); Vincent v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199
So. 593 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941); Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Co., 9 So.(2d)
87 (La. App. 2d cir. 1942). But cf. Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creosoting
Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d cir. 1928); Owers v. Louisiana Long Leaf
Lumber Co., 14 So.(2d) 275 (La. App. 1st cir. 1943); Grant v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 33 So.(2d) 575 (La. App. 2d cir. 1947).
27. Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 175 So. 881 (La. App. 2d cir. 1937);
Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939) (same
case on retrial).
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ployee, partner,. or contractor acting for the defendant.2 8 How-
ever, in only one reported case2 9 have the courts branded such
a sale as a subterfuge. Generally, in support of the bona fide
character of these arrangements the courts have relied upon the
fact that the intermediary negotiated the sale-resale transaction
as an independent enterpriser30 or that he was free to resell to
whomsoever he pleased.8 1 Nevertheless, on several occasions they
have supported deals in which the intermediary was a former
employee of defendant 32 or was operating under an exclusive
resale arrangement with the latter.3 8 Whether the intermediary
regarded himself as a seller or a contractor has been regarded
as important in determining his status in a few cases.3 4
In two reported instances where the transaction was re-
garded as a bona fide sale the initial negotiations were conducted
with the assistance of a representative of the defendant,38 and
28. See Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587, 590 (La. App. 1st
cir. 1941); Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590, 592 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1941); Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Co., 9 So.(2d) 87, 90
(La. App. 2d cir. 1942).
29. Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1928).
30. Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir.
1932); Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939);
Scott v. Futrell, 197 So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940); Vincent v. Industrial
Lumber Co., 199 So. 593 (La. App. 1st dir. 1941); Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lum-
ber Co., 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 2d cir. 1942); Windham v. Newport Co., 143
So. 538 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932) (semble).
31. Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 175 So. 881 (La. App. 2d cir. 1937);
Harris v. Southern Kraft Corp., 183 So. 65 (La. App. 2d cir. 1938); Anthony
v. Natalbany Lumber Co., Ltd., 187 So. 288 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Scott v.
Futrell, 197 So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940); Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber
Co., 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 2d cir. 1942); Williams v. George, 15 So.(2d) 823
(La. App. 2d cir. 1943). Cf. Weldon v. Pickering Lumber Corp., 186 So, 371
(La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Stanley v. Industrial Lumber Co., 193 So. 367 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1940) (In the last two named cases the court found defendant
was a seller and that the intermediary was a buyer. The court emphasized
in both instances that the latter was free to resell to whomsoever he chose.).
32. Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir.
1932); Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 175 So. 881 (La. App. 2d cir. 1937);
Cannon v. Tremont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939 (same case
on retrial); Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1st
cir. 1941); Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App.
1st cir. 1941). See also Scott v. Futrell, 197 So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940).
Cf. Weldon v. Pickering Lumber Corp., 186 So. 371 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939).
But cf. Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1928), where fact that intermediary was a former employee of defendant
was persuasive in characterizing the former as an employee.
33. Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941);
Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941).
34. Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1928) (intermediary regarded himself as an employee purchasing for
defendant; the court held he was not a seller). Compare Eaves v. Hillyer-
Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir. 1932).
35. Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941)
(owner's initial offer to sell directly to defendant was rejected. Defendant
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in one extreme decision the negotiations had been completed
between the landowner and defendant before the intermediary
was apprised of the transaction. 6 In nearly all the cases the
defendant was consulted and his approval secured prior to the
consummation of the transaction. Since the middleman usually
is not financially solvent the landowner generally requires the
defendant to hold back the stumpage charge from the purchase
price on resale and remit this directly to him. Thus the sale to
the middleman is made exclusively upon the credit of the de-
fendant3 7 This fact, however, has never caused the transaction
to lose its character as a good faith sale and resale A8
An illustration of the extent to which the position described
above has been carried is furnished in Reed v. J. W. Jeffries
Lumber Company.39 In that case the owner of a tract of timber-
land refused to sell to an intermediary on a credit basis. As a
result of negotiations, the timber was transferred directly to
defendant lumber company, who paid cash and was named as
purchaser in the deed. The purchase price, however, was
charged by defendant against the intermediary's account, to be
credited as timber was cut and delivered by him to defendant.
used intermediary to cover up the price.); Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Ed-
wards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941) (similar). Cf. Vincent v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 593 (La. App. 1st cir. 1941) (defendant's rep-
resentatives visited owner to see that timber under consideration conformed
to defendant's specifications).
36. Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters, 33 So.(2d) 575 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1947).
37. However, In three reported cases when the intermediary purchased
for purpose of resale to defendant, it appeared that he purchased the tim-
ber with his own funds or credit: Whitley v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc.,
142 So. 798 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932); Harris v. Southern Kraft Corp., 183 So.
65 (La. App. 2d cir. 1938); Weldon v. Pickering Lumber Corp., 186 So. 371
(La. App. 1st cir. 1939). This fact tends strongly to support the good faith
sale character of the transaction.
38. In the following cases defendant withheld stumpage from money
due intermediary. The transaction was nevertheless regarded as a sale:
Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La. App. 2d cir. 1932);
Windham v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932); Cannon v.
Tremont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939); Weldon v. Pickering
Lumber Corp., 186 So. 371 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Anthony v. Natalbany
Lumber Co., Ltd., 187 So. 288 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939); Scott v. Futrell, 197
So. 688 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940); Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587
(La. App. 1st cir. 1941); Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590
(La. App. 1st cir. 1941); Vincent v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 593 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1941); Williams v. George, 15 So.(2d) 823 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943);
Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters, 33 So.(2d) 575 (La. App. 2d cir. 1947).
Cf. Stanley v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 193 So. 367 (La. App. 1st cir. 1940)
(defendant claimed it sold stumps to intermediary. Stumpage withheld by
repurchase for benefit of defendant.). But cf. Carter v. Colfax Lumber &
Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d cir. 1928).
39. 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 2d cir. 1942).
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Chargeable also against the account were severance taxes and
interest and carrying charges on the money advanced. The
transaction was regarded as a bona fide sale from the interme-
diary to defendant, and a compensation claim by the interme-
diary's employee under Section Six was dismissed. The court's
position was fortified by the observation that the intermediary
had previously purchased timber through the financial assistance
of defendant, that he had never served in the latter's employ-
ment, and that part of the timber in question had been sold to
third persons by the intermediary without objection by defend-
ant.
The most extreme example of the situation under discussion
is the recent case, Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters.4 0 Defend-
ant tie company entered into negotiations with a landowner
to purchase timber. The latter was to receive twenty cents from
defendant for each tie cut. Defendant then engaged a sawyer,
McAllister, to cut the ties. He was paid the prevailing market
price per tie after a deduction of the twenty cents for the land-
owner which defendant remitted directly to the latter. Claimant,
an employee of McAllister, sought compensation against defend-
ant for injuries received while he was cutting ties in furtherance
of this arrangement. The court held that no relationship of prin-
cipal and contractor existed between defendant and McAllister,
claimant's employer. It stated that defendant was a purchaser
of manufactured ties. Strangely enough, the opinion assumes
that a principal cannot hire an independent contractor to do
work upon property which the principal does not own at the
time but expects to purchase thereafter. Although defendant
doubtless agreed to purchase ties from the landowner, yet this
should in no way affect his relationship to McAllister whose only
participation in the scheme was to do a job for pay. The fact
that the market price for the ties was used as the basis upon
which the contractor's fee was fixed was a mere matter of con-
venience, and it in no way should affect the nature of the rela-
tionship. McAllister sold nothing to defendant; in fact it was not
contemplated that he should at any time become owner either
of the ties or of the logs from which they were made.
The same attitude prevails when it is disputed whether the
intermediary is a contractor or a purchaser from defendant.
Situations controverted in this respect usually arise where there
40. Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters, 33 So.(2d) 575 (La. App. 2d cir.
1947). See Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 573.
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has been a purported sale by defendant of stumps or timber and
the claim is made that the alleged purchaser is in fact a contrac-
tor who has undertaken to clear the owner's land under an ar-
rangement whereby the stumps are to be sold to some third
party. Employees of the intermediary have been consistently
denied compensation under Section Six.41 The factors empha-
sized are the same noted in the preceding pages.
Although the distinction between a sale and a contract of
service arises most frequently in connection with lumbering
transactions, it is sometimes prominent in other types of cases.
It has been held, for example, that a city may sell an abandoned
standpipe42 under an arrangement whereby the purchaser agrees
to remove it and account for half of the proceeds on resale
without thereby becoming liable for compensation to the pur-
chaser's employees under Section Six. Similarly, a furniture
manufacturer does not subject* himself to liability under this
section to the employees of a person who makes and sells chair
frames on special order, even though the purchaser finances the
acquisition of the wood from which the frames are fabricated. 43
In these cases the problem is simplified somewhat by the fact
that the defendant and the alleged intermediary are not engaged
in the same class of business.
Contractor Distinguished from Lessor
An employee of a lessee of premises or equipment may
attempt to subject the lessor to compensation liability on either
of two theories: First, he may contend that the lease arrange-
ment in fact constitutes a partnership and the lessor is there-
fore the direct employer of the claimant.44 Second, the employee
may claim that the lease arrangement creates in fact the rela-
tionship of principal and contractor between the lessor and
lessee. If this contention is sustained, the lessor may be sub-
jected to liability under Section Six.
41. Weldon v. Pickering Lumbering Corp., 186 So. 371 (La. App. 1st cir.
1939); Stanley v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 193 So. 367 (La. App. 1st cir.
1940).
42. Brown v. City of Shreveport, 15 So.(2d) 234 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943).
43. Wilson v. Roberts, 194 So. 88 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940). Accord: Jones
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939) (dis-
tributor selling petroleum products to filling station for resale is not liable
to purchaser's employees under Section 6).
44. See Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App.
2d cir. 1939). Cf. Malone, The Employer-Employee Relationship under the




An illustration of an unsuccessful attempt to use a lease
arrangement as an evasion of compensation liability under Sec-
tion Six is presented in Snyder v. Kolb.45 Kolb was the owner
of a tract of timberland and a sawmill. He contracted with
Simpson, the employer of the claimant, to operate the sawmill
and convert the timber into crossties at an agreed price. From
this figure was to be deducted fifty cents per thousand feet rep-
resenting the price of the use of the sawmill. This arrangement
was held to create the relation of principal and contractor be-
tween defendant and Simpson, and compensation was allowed
under Section Six despite the fact that the agreement contem-
plated a lease of the sawmill and a deduction from the contrac-
tor's remuneration by reason thereof.
On the other hand, if one who has leased his premises to
another has no interest in the work being carried out by his
lessee, he is not liable for compensation to the latter's employ-
ees.46 The same is true of one who has leased or loaned equip-
ment to another.47 It would seem that 'the lessor should not be
liable to his lessee's employees even though the rental price for
the leased property is fixed in terms of the revenues or profit to
be derived from the lessee's business, although this fact might be
considered with other circumstances as an indication that the
lessor is in fact conducting business through the medium of a
lease.48
Work Which Is a Part of Principal's Business
A principal may contract away any work which is not a part
45. 123 So. 454 (La. App. 2d cir. 1929).
46. Fouchaux v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 193 La. 182,
190 So. 373 (1939).
In Burks v. Glenmora Service Station, 2 La. App. 530 (2d cir. 1925),
a service station leased space to a repairman without charge. Its pur-
pose was to increase its own patronage by reason of the presence of a
repair shop on the premises. It kept books for the lessee and even ad-
vanced pay for the lessee's workers. It was not liable for compensation to
the lessee's helper.
In Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1939), an oil company which leased a service station and required the
lessee to sell its products according to directions was not subject to the
compensation claim of the lessee's helper. But cf. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp. v. Vicars, 221 Ind. App. 387, 46 N.E. (2d) 253 (1943).
47. Kinnard v. Rice Drilling Co., 172 So. 592 (La. App. 2d cir. 1937). Cf.
Sadler v. May Bros., Inc., 185 So. 81 (La. App. 1st cir. 1938) (lender held
not independent contractor under borrower).
48. In Arizona the lessor of a mining property is considered as statu-
tory employer with respect to the employees of its lessee. Arizona Code
Ann. (1939) § 56-928. See also Colorado Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 97, § 328. Similar
conclusions have been reached in other jurisdictions: J. E. Ross & Co. v.
Collins, 224 Ala. 453, 140 So. 764 (1932); S. A. Gerrard v. Industrial Acc. Com-
mission, 17 Cal.(2d) 411, 110 P.(2d) 377 (1941).
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of his regular trade, business or occupation and be free of com-
pensation liability.49 It has been observed that the purpose of
Section Six is to prevent an employer from evading his liability
through the use of an intermediary contractor. It follows that
there is no reason for imposing liability on the principal where
he is using a specialty contractor in some operation for which
he would not be subject to compensation even if he were using
his own employees. Since even direct employees are not entitled
to compensation unless they are engaged in work which is part
of the regular business of the employer,5 0 it is appropriate that
liability under Section Six should be similarly limited.
It has been said that in determining whether or not a given
piece of work is a part of the regular business of the principal
the custom prevailing in the locality is important. Special work
that is not done directly by others engaged in the same line of
business as is the principal will not likely be regarded as sub-
ject to the provisions of Section Six.51 Thus, work in the con-
struction of buildings or equipment to serve an ordinary industrial
establishment can ordinarily be let out to a contractor without the
retention of compensation liability under this section,5 2 and the
same is true of major repairs5 3 and other specialized operations
which are customarily performed by contractors for the business
in question.54 There are frequent statements, however, to the
49. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 131 So. 709, 712 (La.
App. Orl. 1930).
The principal recognized by the act is defined in Section 6 as a person
who "undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business
or occupation . . . and contracts with any [contractor] for the execution by
or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken
by the principal .. " (Italics supplied.)
50. Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act includes only the
employee whose employment is "in the course of his employer's trade, busi-
ness, or occupation."
51. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 131 So. 709, 714 (La. App.
Orl. 1930). See also Adams v. Hicks Co., Ltd., 148 So. 242 (La. App. 2d cir.
1933); Dandridge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 192 So. 887 (La.
App. 2d cir. 1939).
52. Ham v. Domill Construction Co., 8 La. App. 797 (2d cir. 1928) (con-
structing addition to paper mill); Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co.,
Inc., 131 So. 709 (La. App. Orl. 1930) (setting brickwork and constructing
furnace for cotton oil company). But cf. Owers v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lum-
ber Co., 14 So.(2d) 275 (La. App. 1st cir. 1943).
53. Ranson-Rooney v. Overseas Ry., Inc., 134 So. 765 (La. App. Orl. 1931),
affirmed Rooney v. Overseas Ry., Inc., 173 La. 183, 136 So. 486 (1931) (repairs
to crane on dock for a company engaged in loading and operating a vessel);
White v. Equitable Real Estate Co., 139 So. 45 (La. App. Orl. 1932) (repairs
to houses owned and rented out by real estate company).
54. Adams v. Hicks Co., Ltd., 149 So. 242 (La. App. 2d cir. 1933) (long
distance transportation of sugar from mill for wholesale establishment
where it was admitted that defendant did its local hauling directly). Also
cf. Windham v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538, 540 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932) (court
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY
effect that the regular business of an industry may include minor
repairs which are customarily performed by the employer's own
workmen. 55
If the business of the principal is the construction of build-
ings for sale, he cannot let out his work by contract and avoid
compensation.5 6 Presumably this would be true even though the
defendant operated exclusively through the contractors and en-
gaged in no direct building work, since the purpose of the Act
is to prevent evasion through resort to contractors when the
business of defendant is the trafficking in work of this sort.5 7
If the business is one whose operation normally includes a
wide variety of work in the development or severance of natural
resources, it cannot build or install its own structures or equip-
ment through contractors and escape compensation liability, since
installations of this kind are usually made by the principal
directly. This is particularly true of oil producing enterprises.
It has been held that such a business is liable to the employees
of contractors hired to haul pipe and materials for the erection
of oil wells, 58 contractors engaged to weld oil production equip-
ment59 or to pull casings from wells.60 In fact, the statement has
been made that such an enterprise cannot avoid liability even
by showing that work of this kind is customarily done through
specialty contractors.61 This observation was possibly prompted
by the spectre of attempted mass evasion of liability through
the concerted use of contractors.
The lumbering industry has received similar strict treatment
suggests by dictum that cutting and hauling stumps is not part of business
of turpentine refinery); Wilson v. Roberts, 194 So. 88, 90 (La. App. 2d cir.
1940) dictum to effect that preparation of chair frames is not part of busi-
ness of upholsterer and manufacturer of finished furniture). In these last
two cases, however, the court found the intermediary was a seller. Cf.
p. 29, supra.
55. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 131 So. 709, 714 (La.
App. Orl. 1930); Ranson-Rooney v. Overseas Ry., Inc., 134 So. 765, 768 (La.
App. Orl. 1931). It is interesting to note in the last cited case that despite
the court's statement to the effect suggested in the text, repair work on
a crane was held not a part of the business of a ship operator although
his own employee was in fact attempting this work with the assistance of
a helper provided by a contractor.
56. Clementine v. Ritchie, 1 La. App. 296 (Orl. 1924).
57. Cf. Turner v. Oliphant Oil Corp., 200 So. 513 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940).
58. Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 127 So. 25 (La. App. 2d cir.
1930), affirmed Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 130 So.
1 (1930).
59. Dandridge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 192 So. 887 (La.
App. 2d cir. 1939).
60. Turner v. Oliphant Oil Corp., 200 So. 513 (La. App. 2d cir. 1940).
61. Id. at 514.
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in this respect. It is not possible for a lumber concern to con-
tract out its log hauling work without retaining its compensa-
tion liability under Section Six, 62 and it has even been held that
a mill which employed an independent contractor to cut and
haul posts for the construction of a fence upon the principal's
property is liable for compensation to the contractor's employ-
ees.63 In this same case is dictum to the effect that a lumber mill
remains liable under Section Six when it employs a contractor
for the erection of any capital structure.
6 4
The case of Lutz v. Long-Bell Lumber Sales CorporationP5
is noteworthy in this connection. Defendant was engaged in lum-
bering outside of the State of Louisiana exclusively. However,
it maintained a lumber yard within the state which was engaged
in the wholesale distribution of its products. Lumber shipped
in was frequently recut in order to meet requirements of the
local trade. For this purpose it employed a contractor whose
employee, the claimant, was injured. Liability was imposed
under Section Six. The opinion does not make clear whether
the recutting of lumber was to be regarded as part of the regular
business of operating an ordinary lumber yard, or whether all
of defendant's operations, both inside and outside the state
(which, of course, included lumbering), were to be considered in
determining the regular scope of its business. A direct treat-
ment of this interesting problem was precluded by the court's
strained construction of defendant's pleading as an admission
that it was engaged in lumbering within the state.
If a contractor is employed to prepare or process some ma-
terial which will be used by the principal in his business, it may
be difficult to determine whether Section Six is applicable. In
such case the nature of the business and the customs of the
trade will be important. In James v. Dear & Johnson, Incorpo-
rated,6  defendants operated a gravel pit and used a locomotive
in connection with their work. They entered into a contract for
the cutting and hauling of firewood to supply this engine. The
contractor's employee was allowed compensation against defend-
62. Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1928); Hollinsworth v. Crossett Lumber Co., 153 So. 722 (La. App. 2d cir.
1934). But cf. Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters, 33 So.(,2d) 575 (La. App.
2d cir. 1947), discussed p. 33, supra. See particularly concluding paragraph
of Note to this case (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 573.
63. Owers v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 14 So.(2d) 275 (La. App.
1st cir. 1943).
64. Id. at 276.
65. 153 So. 319 (La. App. 1st cir. 1934).
66. 172 So. 25 (La. App. 1st cir. 1937).
[VOL. X
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY
ants on :the view that this work was a part of defendant's regu-
lar business. It seems fair to assume that this decision reflects
the strict attitude discussed earlier with reference to principals
engaged in extensive development work involving the severance
of natural resources; and an ordinary industrial plant which
procures fuel through the work of an independent contractor
might not be similarly treated.
In determining whether contracted work is a part of the
employer's regular business, the scope of the entire contract
should control. This has been suggested in the case of Dandridge
v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York.6 T Defendant,
an oil producing company, had frequent need for welding work.
It maintained several acetylene welders in its employment, but
apparently it had never attempted to do electric welding with
its own crews. Defendant employed a contractor to send welders
equipped to do both electric and acetylene welding. One such
welder was injured and was awarded compensation under Sec-
tion Six although electric welding might be regarded as work
outside the regular business of defendant. Presumably, however,
if the major part of the contracted work is clearly outside the
principal's regular operations, Section Six would not be made
applicable merely because the agreement also included minor
particulars which could be regarded as falling within .the scope
of defendant's regular business.
Section Six has been applied to a public corporation as
principal. A water and sewerage board that contracted out the
construction of a utility is liable for compensation to the employ-
ees of its contractor.6 The fact that the charter under which
-the defendant was organized provided that all construction con-
tracts should be let to the lowest bidder did not prevent Section
Six liability from arising, since this provision did not preclude
the board from engaging in construction work with its own
employees, but merely supplied a procedure to be followed in
the event a contractor should be used.
A final observation seems appropriate here. We have pre-
viously noted 9 in passing that an employee cannot recover from
his direct employer unless he was hired to do work which is a
part of the latter's regular business. Similarly, we see that Sec-
tion Six does not apply unless the work of the contractor is part
67. 192 So. 887 (La. App. 2d cir. 1939).
68. Washington v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 180 So.
199 (La. App. Orl. 1938).
69. Supra, p. 36.
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of the principal's regular trade or business. The question thus
arises as to whether the scope of the business is to be deter-
mined by the same criteria in answering both inquiries. It is
believed that when the court is determining whether a direct
employee is engaged in the regular course of the business of his
employer it will be justified in manifesting a more liberal atti-
tude toward the employee than when liability under Section
Six is in question. On final analysis each enterpriser should
have a fairly free hand in determining the scope of the routine
work he wishes to undertake with his own workers in his busi-
ness, and the practices he adopts are of some importance in this
respect. If he chooses to put his own employee to a task which
might be done through contractors in other similar enterprises,
he has thus afforded some definite indication that he is willing
to treat this work as a part of his own business.70 The frequency
of the need for the particular work in question and the fact that
the direct employee was a member of his regular crew, rather
than an expert employed specially for the occasion, will be im-
portant here.
Hazardous -Nature of Business of Principal or Contractor
In view of the fact that the Compensation Act covers only
hazardous trades, businesses, and occupations,7 1 it follows that
the principal cannot be made liable under Section Six unless
he was engaged in a business of this character. However, if it
is conceded that the work of the contractor is clearly hazardous
and this work is admittedly a part of the regular business of the
principal, the conclusion that the principal is engaged in a hazard-
ous business seems inescapable. In every case where the prin-
cipal has escaped liability under Section Six on the purported
ground that his business was not hazardous there will be found
at least a tacit admission that the hazardous work of the con-
tractor was not a part of the regular business of the principal.
In these cases the discussion of the non-hazardous nature of the
latter's trade has been both unnecessary and confusing.7 2
70. This observation is supported in an interesting dictum in Horrell
v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 131 So. 709, 714 (La. App. Orl. 1930).
But cf. Lutz v. Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corp., 154 So. 645 (La. App. 1st cir.
1934), where the court suggested that if the work was of such a nature as
to subject defendant to liability as a direct employer, he should be made
liable under Section 6.
71. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2)
as amended.
72. See particularly Adams v. Hicks Co., Ltd., 149 So. 242 (La. App. 2d
cir. 1933); White v. Equitable Real Estate Co., 139 So. 45 (La. App. Orl. 1932).
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If it is conceded that the principal is engaged in a hizardous
business, is it further necessary to show that the work of the
contractor was likewise hazardous in character? So long as the
contracted work is a part of the general physical operations of the
principal's hazardous business, this problem will not present any
difficulty, because our courts have consistently held that the
hazardous character of the principal's work is shared by all sub-
ordinate but necessary enterprises that serve it.7 3 Thus, if a
principal engaged in the hazardous business of drilling for oil
contracts out its work of hauling by wagon,' 4 the employees of
the contractor may have compensation from the principal under
Section Six because the hauling business is made hazardous by
reason of being integrated into the work of oil drilling.75
I If, on the other hand, the principal engaged in a hazardous
trade employs a contractor to do work which, although it may
be part of his business, is nevertheless outside the course of his
main physical operations (as where an oil producer contracts
out its bookkeeping work), presumably there could be no re-
covery under Section Six against the principal unless hazardous
methods of accomplishing the work were clearly contemplated
by the parties as an essential part of their agreement. This
seems to be the only conclusion consistent with the purpose of
Section Six, namely, to prevent the use of a contractor to evade
compensation responsibility. In view of the fact that an oil
-producer would not be subject to the compensation claims of
his own clerical staff7'6 no purpose would be served by subjecting
him to liability to his contractor's employees under the circum-
stances described above.
According to our Compensation Act a public corporation is
liable for compensation to its direct employees irrespective of
the hazardous or non-hazardous nature of its work.77 If, however,
73. Durrett v. Woods, 155 La. 533, 99 So. 430 (1923); Gilyard v. O'Reilly,
4 La. App. 498 (Orl. 1926); Beebe v. McKeither Const. Co., 5 La. App. 179 (2d
cir. 1926); Jackson v. Young, 6 La. App. 854 (2d cir. 1927); Liner v. River-
side Gravel Co., 127 So. 146 (La. App. 2d cir. 1930); Wright v. Louisiana Ice
& Utilities Co., 129 So. 436 (La. App. 1st cir. 1930).
74. The business of hauling is normally regarded as non-hazardous.
Brown v. Tranchina, 3 La. App. 761 (Orl. 1926); Alexander v. Tharp-Bult-
man-Southeimer Co., Docket No. 7373, unreported (La. App. Orl. 1921).
75. Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 130 So. 1 (1930).
Accord: Jackson v. Young, 6 La. App. 854 (2d cir. 1927); Williams v. O.K.
Construction Co., Inc., 151 So. 784 (La. App. 2d cir. 1934) (dredging contractor
sublet hauling by wagon); Gilyard v. O'Reilly, 4 La. App. 498 (Orl. 1926)
(contractor laying water lines sublet excavation work).
76. See Malone, Hazardous Businesses and Employments under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law (1948) 22 Tulane L. Rev. 428, 429.
77. See Washington v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 180
So. 199, 205 (La. App. Orl. 1938).
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a public body employs an independent contractor, it will not be
made liable under Section Six to the latter's employees unless
the contracted work is hazardous in nature.
Judgment Against Principal and Contractor-Right to Indemnity
When the principal (or principal contractor) together with
the contractor (or sub-contractor) are successfully sued by an
employee under Section Six, the liability is solidary.7 9 It follows
that the filing of suit against one of the parties interrupts pre-
scription as to the others.8 0 The claimant is entitled to proceed
against either the principal or the contractor, or both, as he may
elect."'
If the principal (or principal contractor) is subjected to lia-
bility, he is entitled to indemnity from the contractor (or sub-
contractor) who directly employed the claimant;8 2 and if there is
more than one intermediary contractor in the chain of employ-
ment, he may have indemnity against them all on a solidary
basis.83 Each intermediary contractor in turn is entitled to in-
demnity against the sub-contractor operating under him, with
the objective of shifting the loss ultimately to the claimant's im-
mediate employer.8 4 All parties other than such employer merely
lend their solvency to the employee's claim. The principal's
right to indemnity is not affected by the fact that he is insured
against Section Six liability. The insurance is regarded as a
78. Ibid.
79. Zeller v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co,, 121 So. 670 (La. App. Or.
1928); Lutz v. Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corp., 153 So. 319 (La. App. 1st cir.
1934). Judgment for solidary liability was imposed without comment In
Snyder v. Kolb, 123 So. 454 (La. App. 2d cir. 1929) and Taylor v. Womack,
22 So.(2d) 73 (La. App. 2d cir. 1945).
80. Zeller v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., 121 So. 670 (La. App. Orl.
1928); Lutz v. Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corp., 153 So. 319 (La. App. 1st cir.
1934). Cf. Art. 2097, La. Civil Code of 1870.
81. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, La. Act 20 of 1914, § 6,
par. 3, as amended:
"3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing an em-
ployee or his dependent from recovering compensation under this act from
the contractor Instead of from the principal."
82. Id. at par. 2.
"2. When the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section,
he shall be entitled to indemnity from any person who independently of
this section would have been liable to pay compensation to the employee or
his dependent and shall have a cause of action therefor." Jones v. Louisiana
Oil Refining Corp., 3 La. App. 85 (2d cir. 1925); Hardoman v. Glassell-Wilson
Co., Inc., 5 La. App. 203 (2d cir. 1926); Williams v. O.K. Construction Co.,
Inc., 155 So. 51 (La. App. 2d cir. 1934); Lindsey v. White, 22 So.(2d) 689
(La. App. 2d cir. 1945).
83. Lindsey v. White, 22 So.(2d) 689 (La. App. 2d cir. 1945).
84. Ibid.
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private arrangement between insurer and insured in which the
indemnitor has no interest.8 5
The right to indemnity has been treated as a claim that ac-
crues to the principal's insurer as well, and he may recoup his
loss in an action against the contractor and the latter's insurer.8 6
Paragraph Four of Section Six confers upon a "principal
contractor" against whom suit has been instituted the right to
call as co-defendant any contractor or subcontractor who may be
liable for indemnity under the Section.8 7 This has been regarded
as a personal warrantry under Article 384 of the Code of Civil
Procedure against a sub-contractor who resides outside the
court's jurisdiction.8 8 Due probably to inadvertence no mention
is made of a corresponding right in a principal to call in warranty
a contractor who may be similarly liable over to him, although
the principal's right to indemnity is clearly recognized and has
been enforced on many occasions. In one decision8 9 the court
has interpreted literally this language of Paragraph Four. The
defendant was a lumber company which had been held liable
to an employee of its contractor who was hired to resaw lumber.
Its demand to call in the contractor as co-defendant was denied,
although presumably a separate suit for indemnity could have
been maintained. It is noteworthy, however, that in two other
cases9" the call in warranty was allowed to a principal who had
contracted away part of his regular trade, business, or occupa-
tion. No mention was made of the difficulty discussed here.
Obviously the right to indemnity is given only in favor of a
principal or principal contractor, no such right exists where the
intermediary is only a lender of the employee9 ' or where he is
merely an employee himself with the privilege of hiring helpers.92
85. Williams v. O.K. Construction Co., Inc., 155 So. 51 (La. App. 2d cir.
1934).
86. Taylor v. Willett, 14 So. (2d) 298 (La. App. 2d cir. 1943).
87. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, La. Act 20 of 1914, § 6,
par. 4, as amended.
"4. A principal contractor, when sued by an employee of a subcontractor
or his dependent, shall have the right to call that subcontractor of any
intermediate contractor or contractors as a codefendant, and the principal
contractor shall be entitled to indemnity from his subcontractor for com-
pensation payments paid by the principal contractor on account of an acci-
dental injury to the employee of the subcontractor."
88. Jones v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 3 La. App. 85 (2d cir. 1925).
89. Lutz v. Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corp., 153 So. 319 (La. App. 1st cir.
1934).
90. Jones v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 3 La. App. 85 (2d cir. 1925);
Lindsey v. White, 22 So.(2d) 689 (La. App. 2d cir. 1945).
91. Sadler v. May Bros., Inc., 185 So. 81 (La. App. 1st cir. 1938).
92. Alphonso v. American Iron & Machine Works Co., 39 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. La. 1941). See Malone, supra note 44, at 332.
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